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How the tax system might affect the individual’s educational level is well studied. But the 
question of how the tax system affects the individual’s choice of educational type is mostly 
ignored. This is an important issue, since the educational choice of today’s young generation 
determines the skill composition of tomorrow’s labor force and hence the future production 
possibilities of the country. This paper studies the problem in a partial model. A progressive 
tax system might in fact introduce distortions in the individuals’s educational choice and 
induce him to choose more of the educational type with the higher consumption value. If he 
also puts more weight on the present than on the future, this effect is strengthened further. 
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 1 Introduction
The OECD countries as a whole spent 5.8 per cent of their collective GDP on
education in 2001, and 12.7 per cent of total public expenditure was devoted to
educational institutions1. Most of these countries oﬀer publicly ﬁnanced primary and
secondary education, and in many countries tertiary education is also provided by the
state at no direct cost for the individual. Part of the justiﬁcation for publicly funded
education is the positive eﬀects of education on the productivity of the country2.
The government encourages the individuals to get higher education, focusing on the
amount of human capital in society and to a great extent ignoring its composition.
Diﬀerent types of education yield diﬀerent rates of private and social return. It
therefor ought to be of great interest to the government to learn more about the
mechanisms determining the individual’s choice of educational direction, and not
o n l yt h ea m o u n to fe d u c a t i o n .A tt h ev e r yl e a s t ,o n es h o u l db ea w a r eo fw h i c h
kinds of distortions the income tax system imposes on the educational choice of the
individuals. Could it in fact be that the tax system induces the individual to choose
other kinds of education than it would in the absence of taxes?
The individual’s motivation for choosing higher education may be divided into
four categories. First, education is an investment that yields higher wages later in life.
Individuals invest in education until the expected marginal monetary return equals
that of other investment alternatives (Nerlove et.al 1993). Second, education is a
signal of high abilities of the individual and might correct for information problems
in the labor market (Stiglitz 1975). Third, education is insurance against unemploy-
ment (Bishop 1994). Fourth, education oﬀers non-monetary and non-market types of
return, both during the education itself and afterwards (Becker 1964, Lazear 1977).
Among these are the joy of learning new things, meeting new people, moving to a
new city, enjoying the life as a student, in addition to the increased status in the
society that often comes with studying in particular ﬁelds. It is important to remem-
ber that even if education is treated as homogenous in the literature, it is in fact
a heterogenous investment alternative and consumption good. Thus diﬀerent kinds
of education generate diﬀerent levels of joy or satisfaction during the educational
process. Also, diﬀerent kinds of education require diﬀerent levels of eﬀort in order to
1OECD: Education at a Glance.
2See Lucas (1988).
2graduate, a factor the student also considers. After its completion, higher education
enables the individual to choose among more interesting jobs. Diﬀerent educational
types oﬀer diﬀerent degrees of ﬂexibility regarding working hours and the regional
distribution of jobs. Individuals with strong preferences for where to live or for being
able to work part time will value these qualities strongly when choosing type of edu-
cation. Another feature that diﬀers among the diﬀerent educational directions is the
eﬀort required by the student to complete the education, and thus also the amount
of leisure available to the student. Let all these non-market and non-monetary types
of return to education be summarized as the consumption value of education. De-
pending on their preferences, individuals put diﬀerent weight on the consumption
value when choosing educational type.
Fredriksson (1997) shows on Swedish data that the demand for education re-
sponds to economic incentives; more students enrolled at the universities in peri-
ods with high expected wage returns or with particularly beneﬁcial student loans
arrangements. The link between the income tax system and the length of the indi-
vidual’s education is well studied in the literature. Higher education is considered as
an investment alternative in which the individual invests until the expected marginal
monetary return equals that of other investment alternatives. Taxes on ﬁnancial in-
come increases the relative monetary return to education, and taxes on labor income
reduces the return to human capital investments (Boskin 1975, Heckman 1976). The
nature of the tax schedule also aﬀects the attractiveness of human capital invest-
ments. If no direct costs of acquiring education besides foregone labor income are
present, a proportional tax on labor income is a neutral tax on the return to human
capital investments. But if a positive tax on capital income exists as well, the com-
prehensive proportional income tax induces the individual to over-invest in human
capital (Nielsen and Sørensen 1997). This eﬀect is even stronger if education has a
positive consumption value as well (Alstadsæter 2003). On the other hand, if edu-
cation requires direct monetary investments, a comprehensive proportional income
tax discriminates against human capital investments. (Trostel 1993).
Monetary return to the education no doubt is an important factor in the indi-
vidual’s educational choice, but it is a drawback for the explanatory power of the
economic models that the other motives behind the educational choice mostly are
ignored. For instance is the Norwegian labor force among the most highly educated
3in the OECD3, but still has a compressed wage structure and moderate wage return
to higher education. Where a country as the US at the present has an average wage
premium4 to an additional year of higher education of 10 %, the corresponding rate
i nN o r w a yi s5 , 5% .T h i si st h ea v e r a g ew a g er e t u r no v e ra l lk i n d so fe d u c a t i o na t
t h es a m ed u r a t i o n .B u td i ﬀerent types of education do in fact generate diﬀerent
rates of wage return, even if they have the same duration. As shown by Moen and
Semmingsen (1996), some kinds of higher education have negative wage return in
Norway compared with having only high school. Still the number of students at
universities and regional colleges has more than doubled over the last 20 years5.I t
thus seems like the students are willing to forego future monetary return in order to
get the non-monetary return to the educational type of their choice.
The educational choice of today’s young generation determines the skill compo-
sition and hence the production possibilities of tomorrow’s labor force. Small open
economies with high wage levels, as many of the European countries, experience a
ﬂagging-out of their industrial production to low-cost countries. A consensus exists
in these countries that the future economic growth depends on their abilities to
transfer into knowledge-based industries and innovation production. In order to do
this, a highly educated labor force with the required skill combination is essential.
Little attention has been given the link between the country’s income tax system
and the individual’s choice of educational direction. If it is so that the tax system not
only aﬀects how much education the individuals choose to get, but also which kind
of education they choose, then the tax system indeed aﬀects the future production
possibilities.
This paper analyzes how the individual’s trade-oﬀ between monetary and non-
monetary return in his choice of educational type is aﬀected by the tax system.
Depending on the individual’s preferences, a progressive tax system might in fact
introduce distortions in the individuals’s educational choice and induce him to choose
more of the educational type with the higher consumption value. If he also puts more
weight on the present than on the future, this eﬀect is strengthened further. Section
2 presents the model, the analysis is done in section 3, section 4 presents empirical
evidence, and section 5 concludes.
3OECD: Education at a glance.
4Source: Psacharopoulos and Patrinos, 2002.
5Hægeland and Møen (2000)
42 The model
The representative individual6 lives for two periods. He already has decided to spend
all available time in the ﬁrst period on acquiring education and getting a bachelors
degree at university level. The remaining decision to make is which subjects to choose
for the degree. By modelling the educational choice in this simpliﬁed manner, the
choice of educational type is cultivated and undisturbed by the decision whether or
n o tt og e te d u c a t i o ni nt h eﬁrst place7.
Consider the extreme case where the wage return is either low or high, and
where the consumption value of the educational type is either low or high. The four
diﬀerent combinations of the educational attributes are:.
Type-A education: High consumption value and low wage return.
Type-B education: Low consumption value and high wage return.
Type-R education: High consumption value and high wage return.
Type-S education: Low consumption value and low wage return.
No rational individual would choose type-S education, since he is much better
oﬀ by choosing one of the other three alternatives. This educational alternative may
hence safely be disregarded in the analysis. In this setting, all individuals would
choose type-R education, since this oﬀers both high consumption value and high
future wages. If this was true in a perfect competitive educational market, all indi-
viduals would choose this type of education, and the whole skilled labor force would
have identical qualiﬁcations. Assume that type-R is an education with restricted
admission, as the case is for among others for most business schools and medical
schools. Then only a selected sample of the individuals may consume this very ad-
vantageous education. The following analysis focuses on the educational choice of
6Here I consider a representative individual. But individuals are diﬀerent. Even if a tax does
not distort the average individual’s educational choice, it could strongly distort the individuals
who have non-average preferences This distortion arises even if the preferences are symmetrically
distributed around the average. If some overinvest in education, while others underinvest, it leads
to an ineﬃcient resource allocation. This eﬀect is not considered in the present paper.
7A more general and realistic speciﬁcation would be to allow the individual to choose in the
ﬁrst period how much of his time to spend on getting education, on labour, and on leisure. In this
paper I simplify by assuming that the choices of how much and which kind of education to acquire
are separarble. This is analog to the litterature on saving and portfolio choice, where the savings
decision is analyzed separatelly from the protfolio choice.
5the individual when perfect competition exists in the educational sector. Both type-
A and type-B education have free admission, and the following model analyzes how
taxes aﬀect the individual’s choice between these two kinds of education. In the
following, consider the extreme case where the consumption value of type-A edu-
cation is positive, while the consumption value of type-B education is negative. So
no rational individual chooses type-B education unless he is compensated for the
negative consumption value in some way or another. Let the wage return to type-
B e d u c a t i o nc o m p a r e dw i t hg e t t i n gt y p e - A education be positive. If the individual
chooses to get type-A education he puts more weight on the non-pecuniary return
to the education and foregoes other consumption since his income is lower than it
would have been had he chosen type-B education.
The individual chooses the optimal linear combination of the two types of ed-
ucation, A and B, in the ﬁrst period. The parameters EA and EB denominate the
fraction of available time spent on type-A and type-B education, respectively. These
fractions are restricted to be between zero and one, and they sum up to one8:
EA + EB =1 . (1)
and
EA ∈ h0,1i,E B ∈ h0,1i.
By combining the two educational directions, A and B,i nd i ﬀerent manners, the
individual has a continuum of diﬀerent kinds of bachelor degrees to choose from.
Normally one considers the educational choice to be discrete, in which the individ-
ual would have to choose either type-A or type-B education, as is the fact in the
previously described type R education. In this paper the educational choice is con-
tinuos, in which the individual may choose to combine the two kinds of education
as he wishes.
The model is competitive where the solution to be described later is the partial
equilibrium solution in a competitive model. This puts restrictions on the analysis,
and among them the most important one is that no supply eﬀects are considered.
Educational institutions mostly have a limited supply of student places within each
program, and popular programs introduce admission restrictions. This eﬀect is ab-
sent in this model. As long as the individual wishes to acquire more of one type of
education, he may do so.
8This sum has no particular signiﬁcance in this model, since the unit of measurement is arbitrary.
6First and second period are not restricted to have the same duration, and so
the second period may be much longer than the ﬁrst period. Most people do spend
more of their lifetime working then they do getting education. The individual is
also assumed stay in the same job for the whole second period. This is the extreme
v e r s i o no ft h el o c k - i ne ﬀect that to some extent exists in the labour market; the
individual has full freedom in his choice of educational type, but he has limited
possibility to change this choice after the completion of the education. Since his pre-
education qualiﬁcations determine for which jobs he qualiﬁes, he has a limited range
of jobs to choose from. The time spent working, H, is given in the second period
and independent of the educational proﬁle chosen in the ﬁrst period. Seeing that
type-B education leads to a stressful and less enjoyable job that pays better than the
alternative, one might also expect that a job requiring type-B qualiﬁcations would
demand longer hours. That aspect is not considered here. Hence the duration of the
second period and the hours worked are independent of the educational proﬁle.
In each period the consumer gets utility from ordinary consumption and educa-
tion. Education is both a consumption good and an investment alternative. Type A
education yields a direct utility gain in the ﬁrst period because of the advantageous
nature of the education. On the other hand, type-B education generates a direct util-
ity loss because it both is a tiring educational process, and because the job it qualiﬁes
for has many negative characteristics. At the same time, the educational choice also
aﬀects the bundle of goods the individual may consume in the two periods, C1 and
C2. Type B education increases the individual’s consumption possibilities compared
with type-A education. The individual’s preferences are represented by the utility
function
U = U(C1,C 2,E A). (2)
Utility is increasing in all three consumption goods, C1,C 2, and EA.F i r s ta n d
second period consumption are both assumed to be normal goods, and so is type-A
education. It follows from equations (1) and (2) that U(C1,C 2,E A)=U(C1,C 2,1−
EB), and hence the marginal utility of type-B education is negative.
A bachelors degree yield the expected wage return w, where the probability of
future unemployment is accounted for. Let type-A education generate zero addi-
tional wage return in the second period, such that the individual’s total expected
wage in the second period by investing EA units in type-A education in the ﬁrst
period is given by w · EA · H. Type B education generates an additional propor-
7tional9 expected wage return e, and the expected second period wage is hence given
by (w + e)·EB·H. Diﬀerent types of education have diﬀerent probabilities for future
unemployment, and this aﬀects the expected wage return to education. For instance
would a high probability of unemployment for individuals with type-A qualiﬁcations
and less probability of unemployment for individuals with type-B qualiﬁcations im-
ply a large diﬀerence in the expected marginal wage returns to the two kinds of
education, whit a low w and a high e.
No tuition fees are paid, but the individual needs to ﬁnance his living expenses in
the ﬁrst period. He borrows money in the ﬁn a n c i a lm a r k e ta tag i v e ni n t e r e s tr a t er.
In the absence of liquidity constraints, he ﬁnances all his ﬁrst period consumption,
C1 , through debt, D. All debt is paid back in the second period10.T h e r ee x i s tn o
non-labor income or intergenerational transfers in the model. His ﬁrst period budget
constraint is hence given by:
C1 = D. (3)
T h et i m es p e n tw o r k i n gi nt h es e c o n dp e r i o d ,H, is exogenously given and inde-
pendent of the educational proﬁle. Second period consumption, C2, depends crucially
on the chosen educational proﬁle. The basic expected w is paid to the individual on
all hours he works, independent of his skills. The basic wage is taxed at the rate tw.
In addition, the individual receives a positive wage return e proportional to all units
of type-B education he underwent in the ﬁrst period. This additional wage return
to education is also taxed at the basic tax rate tw, but in addition a surtax of te
applies. His second period consumption is hence given by:
C2 =[ 1 − tw] · w · EA · H +[ 1− tw] · w · EB · H (4)
+[1− (tw + te)] · e · EB · H − [1 + r] · D,
If te =0 , tax on labour income is proportional, and if te > 0, tax on labour income
is progressive. Obviously, if tw = te =0 , there is no tax on labour income. Both
tax rates are restricted to be larger than or equal to zero, and smaller than one.
9An alternative is to model the marginal returna sap o s i t i v ea n dd e c r e a s i n gf u n c t i o no ft h e
time spent on type B education, k(EB), but as the proportional return to education is the simplest
way to illustrate our point, that is the method chosen for this paper.
10This two-period model simpliﬁes reality a great deal. It actually means that the individual gets
paid in advance, at the beginning of the period, such as to be able to pay back the debt he issued
to ﬁnance his living expenses in the ﬁrst period.
8Regressive income taxation is no option here. The interest rate r is the discount
factor, and r is the exogenously determined net interest rate. A change in the tax
rates on labor income hence leaves the tax rate on capital income unaﬀected11.
Thus the net interest rate and the discount factor are unaﬀected by the tax on
labor income. By combining the equations (3) and (4), we ﬁnd the individual’s life
time budget constraint where type-A education is a consumption good for which the





[1 − tw − te] · e · H
1+r
· EA =
[1 − tw] · [w + e] − te · e
1+r
· H. (5)
The right hand side of (5) represents the individual’s full income, which is the
maximum achievable income had he chosen only type-B education. The left hand
side is the diﬀerent kinds of consumption. Type A education is now explicitly viewed
as a consumption good with a well deﬁned price, namely the present value of the
marginal wage premium by choosing the alternative type-B education. The price
of one additional unit of this type-A education is the income he gives up by not
choosing type-B education. Denote this alternative price of type-A education as
pA :
pA ≡
[1 − tw − te] · e · H
1+r
. (6)
The presence of taxes in the economy reduces the price of type-A education as a con-
sumption good, and and this substitution eﬀect induces the individual to get more
type-A and less type-B education. This eﬀect is even stronger with a progressive
tax system, te > 0. The individual makes his consumption and investment decisions
f o rt h ew h o l eo fh i sl i f es p a ni nt h eﬁr s tp e r i o d .T h eh i g h e rh i sd i s c o u n tr a t ei s ,t h e
more weight he puts on the present and less on the future. That is, the higher the
net interest rate r is, the more ﬁrst period consumption matters relative to second
period consumption, and the more type-A education he chooses to consume. The
opposite is the result the higher the wage return to type-B education, e,i so rt h e
longer the duration of his second period working life, H, is. Then the substitution
eﬀect induces the individual to choose less type-A education.
E v e ni ft h ei n c o m et a x e sr e d u c et h ep r i c eo ft y p e - A education as a consumption
11This corresponds to the Scandinavian system of dual income taxation, where tax rates on
labour and capital income are set separately.
9good, they also reduces total net income. This negative income eﬀect would induce
the individual to consume less of all goods, including type-A education. The total
eﬀect of the taxes on the individual’s educational choice is found in the next chapter.
This is a partial model that only investigates the individual’s educational deci-
sion, and hence the governmental budget constraint is disregarded.
3 The tax analysis.
3.1 The eﬀect of income tax on the educational choice.
I nt h ef o l l o w i n g ,l e tt h ep r i c e so nﬁrst and second period consumption be





This allows us to deﬁne the price vector p =( p1,p 2,p A). Also, let the individual’s
full income be deﬁned as y :
y ≡
[1 − tw] · [w + e] − te · e
1+r
· H. (9)
Applying this new notation reduces the individual’s life time budget constraint (5)
to p1C1 +p2C2 +pAEA = y. This new notation simpliﬁes the following development
of the response function to a tax change in our particular case.
The individual maximizes his utility under the restriction that his lifetime budget
constraint must bind. Manipulating the ﬁrst order conditions and utilizing the ﬁrst
period time constraint, the Marshallian demand functions are found:
C1(p,y),C 2(p,y), and EA(p,y).
So how does the tax on labor income aﬀect the individual’s educational choice?
Consider a marginal increase in the tax rates on labour income and investigate how
these inﬂuence the individual’s division of ﬁrst period time between type-A and
type-B education. The eﬀects on the two kinds of education are symmetrical. Since
we from (1) have that EA + EB =1 , it follows that ∆EB = −∆EA. H e n c ei ti s
suﬃcient to investigate the eﬀect of tax changes on type-A education. The eﬀect of















,i = w,e. (10)
10As a response function to a tax change, equation (10) is rather unconventional, since
the income eﬀect enters twice. A tax increase reduces the price on type-A education
as a consumption good. The ﬁrst element on the right hand side of the equation is
this price eﬀect, which consists of the substitution eﬀect and the income eﬀect of a
tax increase. But type-A education is also an investment alternative, and the tax
reduces the expected return to this investment, measured in expected future wages,
and the second element on the right hand side of (10) is this income eﬀect. Thus
the tax increase aﬀects the individual’s educational choice through two sources; it
changes the value of the individual’s human capital stock, which in turn determines
his income. It also changes the consumption price on education, in which it aﬀects
the relative wage return to the two kinds of education. For this reason the second
income eﬀect enters the individual’s response function.
The ﬁrst component of the right hand side of (10) reﬂects how a tax change
aﬀects the price of education as a consumption good. This component consists in
two factors; the ﬁrst is the price-eﬀect, which shows how a price change alters the
demand for education as a good. The second fraction tells us how much the price
of the educational good A is aﬀected by a tax change. The price-eﬀect consists of a










· (1 − EA) (11)
Total change in the consumption of the educational good A following a price
change is given by the substitution eﬀect and the income eﬀect. The substitution
eﬀect states how much a price change aﬀects the individual’s consumption of type-A
education when his income is adjusted such that he may achieve the same utility
level. The price change aﬀects the real income and the purchasing power of the
individual. In turn this aﬀects the achievable consumption bundle of the individual,
a n dt h i si st h ei n c o m ee ﬀect.
A tax change also alters the return to education as an investment alternative,
namely the second period wage. This is represented by the second component of the
right hand side of (10). Increased income induces the individual to consume more of
all normal goods, including type-A education,
∂EA
∂y > 0. But increased taxes reduce
total net income,
∂y
∂t < 0.T h et o t a lo ft h e s et w oe ﬀects predicts a negative value on
12See the Appendix for the deduction of this equation.
11the second component of the right hand side of (10).
Combining all this information, the complete eﬀect of a tax change on the indi-





















,i = w,e. (12)
Symmetry implies that if the individual chooses less type-A education, he chooses
more type-B education. Also, these changes cancel out, such that the total amount







This is the general equation; let us now analyze the two cases i = w and i = e
separately.
3.2 The eﬀect of increased top marginal income tax, te.
The surtax te is levied on the additional wage return e that the individual receives
by choosing type-B education. The eﬀe c tt h i ss u r t a xh a so nt h ei n d i v i d u a l ’ sc h o i c e
of educational type is found from equation (12) by substituting i = e.F r o m( 9 )a n d





























Type A education is a normal good, and the substitution eﬀect of a price increase
is negative. With increased income the individual consumes more of all goods, and
hence the income eﬀect, is positive. The fraction of the individual’s time in the
ﬁrst period spent on type-B education is equal to or smaller than one, and hence
(1+EB) is larger than one. This tax increase only aﬀects the additional wage return
to the education with negative consumption value, and the basic wage is unaﬀected
by this. The tax reduces the individual’s disposable income, but at the same time
reduces the price on type-A education as a consumption good. Whether the increased
surtax induces the individual to increase or reduce the amount of type-A education
12he chooses depends entirely on which eﬀect dominates, the substitution eﬀect or the











If the substitution eﬀect dominates the income eﬀect, the individual’s preference
structure is of such a kind that he puts great emphasis on the consumption value
of type-A education. The tax increase reduces the price on type-A education mea-
sured in foregone wage return by not choosing type-B education, and the individual
changes his educational proﬁle by choosing more of the education with the tax free
consumption return. Then
∂EA
∂te > 0. The more type-B education the individual has
in his original educational portfolio, the stronger is the income eﬀect. Increased top
marginal tax rate reduces the return to the education with the less advantageous
conditions, and hence the individual chooses less type-B education. This follows
from the symmetry assumption in equation (1). The individual experiences a net
income reduction through two channels; the tax increase and the reduced investment
in type-B education. In order for this to be a sustainable solution, the individual
hence reduces his consumption of the other consumption goods, represented by ﬁrst
and second period consumption, C1 and C2.
Increased top marginal tax induces the individual to choose less type-A educa-
tion, and more type-B education if the income eﬀect dominates the substitution
eﬀect.
The sign of the eﬀect on the individual’s educational portfolio of an increase in the
surtax depends entirely on the income and substitution eﬀects. But the amplitude
of the eﬀect is partly determined by the fraction e·H
1+r.T h eh i g h e rt h ew a g er e t u r no r
the length of the second period are, the higher is the return to type-B education,
and the larger is the eﬀect of an tax increase.
T h ei m p o r t a n c eo ft h ed i s c o u n tr a t e . The higher the discount rate, the more
does the individual value consumption and income in the present, and the less does
he care about the future income when making his educational choice. The present
consumption value of type-A education matters more for the individual than the
future expected wages, especially since the price, measured in the present value of
future foregone wages, is reduced through this high valuation of the present. A higher
13discount rate thus dampens the eﬀect of the tax increase. It also alters the relative
price between ordinary ﬁrst period consumption, C1, a n dt h ee d u c a t i o ng o o dA.T h e
higher interest rate, the more expensive is it to borrow in the ﬁnancial market in
order to ﬁnance ﬁrst period ordinary consumption, and this reduces the marginal
substitution rate between type-A education and ordinary ﬁrst period consumption.
I no u rm o d e lt h ed i s c o u n tr a t ei st h en e to ft a xr e a li n t e r e s tr a t e .Ah i g ht a xr a t eo n
capital income would thus reduce the discount rate and increase the relative price
on type-A education.
Increased uncertainty of the future has the same eﬀect as an increased discount
rate. If the future wage return to higher education is uncertain, the expected wage
return to type-B education is reduced, and so is the price on the consumption good
type-A education.
3.3 The eﬀect of increased basic labor income tax, tw.
The tax rate tw is levied on all wage income earned by an educated worker. From










[w + e] · H
1+r
.













As in the previous case, the eﬀect of this increased tax on the composition of
the individual’s educational portfolio depends entirely on the individual’s preference
structure. But, since this tax reduces his disposable income from all sources, and
not only the wage return to type-B education, the income eﬀect is more dominant
in this case. Even if the income eﬀect and substitution eﬀect would cancel out in
equation (13), a tax increase would still induce the individual to consume less type-A
education in this case. This is due to the increased importance of the income eﬀect in
equation (15) which appears through the additional fraction on the right hand side
of equation (15), namely −
∂EA
∂y · w·H
1+r. This fraction is higher the longer the working
period and the wage return to type-B are. The importance of the income eﬀect
14is somewhat neutralized by a high discount factor when the individual treasures
consumption today more than consumption tomorrow.
I ft h ei n c o m ee ﬀect dominates the substitution eﬀect, then the total eﬀect of an
increased basic labor income tax for sure is negative. The reduced income level in-
duces the individual to reduce consumption of all goods, including type-A education,
and the educational portfolio changes in the direction of less type-A education and
more type-B education. This is also through if the income and substitution eﬀects
cancel out.
If the individual has very strong preferences for education as a consumption good,
he might choose more type-A education when the tax increases. In that case the
substitution eﬀect must be so much larger than the income eﬀe c ta st oc o m p e n s a t e
for the additional weight put on the income eﬀect through the new fraction on the
r i g h th a n ds i d eo fe q u a t i o n( 1 5 ) .
These are general results. Now consider a speciﬁc utility function as described
below, in order to study more closely the importance and sizes of the substitution
and income eﬀects.
3.4 A speciﬁc utility function.





where C ≡ C1 + C2
1+r is total ordinary consumption, and where both ordinary con-
sumption and type-A education are normal goods (α > 0, and θ > 0). In this case
the individual’s lifetime budget constraint is given by
pc · C + pA · EA = y, (17)
where pc is the price of ordinary consumption goods, pA is the price of type-A
education as a consumption good (deﬁned by equation 6), and y is the individual’s









The individual can at most achieve the utility level V , and evaluated at this point,
the compensated demand function is identical to (18).
15Now investigate under which condition the substitution eﬀect dominates the in-
come eﬀect in the Slutsky-equation (11) under the given conditions. The substitution





(θ + α) · p2
A
, (19)
and the income eﬀect by
∂EA
∂y
· (1 − EA)=





As it turns out, the substitution eﬀect always dominates the income eﬀect. Thus,
if type-A education had been an ordinary consumption good, the individual would
respond to price increases (decreases) by reducing (increasing) his consumption of
this good,
∂EA
∂pA < 0. But since it also is an investment alternative, tax changes not
only aﬀe c tt h ep r i c eo nt y p e - A education as a consumption good, but also the return
to it as an investment alternative. Thus the income eﬀect must be included once
more, and this makes the individual’s respond to tax changes more uncertain.
The eﬀect on the educational choice of increased surtax. The eﬀect on an
increase in the top marginal income tax on labor income on an individual with the





(θ +2 α) · (1 − tw) · w − θ · (1 − tw − te) · e
(θ + α)
2 · (1 − tw − te)
2 · e
. (21)
An increase in the surtax induces the individual to choose more type-A education








1 − tw − te
.
Several factor aﬀect the outcome of an increase in the surtax on the individual’s
educational choice. The more compressed the wage structure, that is, the lower the
expected relative wage return of choosing type-B education over type-A education,
e
w, the more likely is it that a higher surtax induces him to choose more type-A
education. The income eﬀect is less important the lower the relative wage return to
type-B education is. Also, the after-tax wage structure is more compressed the higher
the surtax is, and this has the same eﬀect as a compressed pre-tax wage structure
on the individual’s educational choice. The stronger preferences the individual has
for type-A education, the higher is α, and the more likely is it that the individual
responds to an increased surtax by choosing more type-A education.
16If the individual chooses more type-A and less type-B education his disposable
income is reduced, and he thus must reduce his ordinary consumption, C.T h el o w e r
the after-tax wage return to investing in type-B education, the smaller is the income
loss by choosing more type-A education, and the less ordinary consumption must
he forego in order to increase the consumption of the educational good.
The eﬀect on the educational choice of increased basic labor income tax.
The eﬀect on an increase in the basic labor income tax on the educational choice of
an individual with the previously described preferences is found by combining the




α · (1 − tw) · (α · w − θ · e)+te · α · [θ · (e + w)+α · w]
(θ + α)
2 · (1 − tw − te)
2 · e
. (22)




α · (1 − tw + te)+θ · te
θ · (1 − tw − te)
.
A high basic labor income tax reduces the after-tax wage compression, and it in-
creases the relative price on type-A e d u c a t i o nm e a s u r e di nf o r e g o n en e tl a b o ri n c o m e
by not choosing type-B education. Only if te < 1 − tw can
∂EA
∂tw > 0. The higher the
tax on labor income, the more dominant is the income eﬀect, since the return to all
educational types is reduced through the tax increase. The individual hence must
have strong preferences for type-A education in order to consume more of it when
the basic labor income tax increases, and even stronger preferences than required
for the substitution eﬀect to dominate when the surtax is increased.
4 Empirical evidence.
There has been a 90 percent increase in the number of university graduates in Norway
in the period from 1987 to 2002. Even though the number of science graduates is
more or less stabile over the period, each year a smaller share of the students choose
science as their ﬁeld of study. In 1987 as many as 30.5% of all the graduates were
science or engineering majors, while this share had sunk to 17.4% in 2002. Figure
17Figure 1: Annual number of Norwegian university graduates by subject, indexed,
1987=100.




























113 shows the popularity of diﬀerent ﬁelds of study over time, and all ﬁelds except
science and business increased their popularity over the period.
Even though more chose to get higher education over the period, the average
wage diﬀerentials between individuals with low and high education decreased in
Norway14 over the period15, while it increased in USA, as ﬁgure 2 shows.
Kahn (1998) ﬁnds that the wage setting system in Norway became more central-
ized in the late 1980’ies, which lifted the relative wage level of the lower part of the
wage distribution, compressing the wage distribution over the period.
All Scandinavian countries have a tradition for having high taxes and high mar-
ginal tax rates on labor in order to ﬁnance their big public sectors. Even so, the
marginal tax rate on wage income decreased in Norway in the 1980’ies, and were
13The ﬁgure shows all university graduates, independent of level of the degree. Bear in mind
that the ﬁgure shows graduated students each year, who made their educational choice 4-6 years
prior to graduation, depending on the type of degree completed.
14It is worth noting though, that a great share of the highly educated individuals work in the
public sector, where wages are lower than in the private sector, due to the oligopoly power of the
public sector as employer.
15OECD: Education at a Glance has over some years presented average wage diﬀerentials between
four groups of the labor force: Below upper secondary education, Upper secondary education
(=100), Non-university tertiary education, and University education. Figure 2 shows the index
point diﬀerences between individuals with below upper secondary education and individuals with
university education.
18Figure 2: Income inequality between the labor force participants with the highest and
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Figure 3: Top marginal tax rates on wage income in Norway 1984-2003.






























stabilized around 50 % in the 1992 tax reform16.A sﬁgure 3 shows, it later increased
to 55,3%. High marginal tax rates makes it more expensive to increase the after-tax
income of high-income individuals in centralized wage bargaining, and this serves as
a disciplinary factor in the wage negotiations and may lead to a more compressed
wage structure.17
As a country gets richer and the income level of the inhabitants increases, they
wish to increase their consumption of all normal goods, including education. It is
natural to expect that they put more weight on the consumption value of the diﬀerent
educational types when making their educational choice, and that they would choose
more of the educational types with the higher consumption value. From 1990 to 1997,
GDP per capita increased by 30% in Norway, and the country had the highest labor
16Which was a base broadening, rate cutting reform, where the dual income tax with its sepa-
ration of capital income and labor income was introduced.
17For an overview on the empirical literature on this issue, see Sørensen (1997).

























force participation rate (84.4%) in the OECD in 1997, after years of decreasing
unemployment. Then one can assume that the individuals choosing ﬁeld of would
care less about the future job possibilities from choosing a particular ﬁeld of study,
and more about how demanding and enjoyable the type of education is. There is
a lag here, since the individuals choose educational type based on their present
expectancy of future wages, and the situation may have changed a great deal until
they graduate, such that the actual wage return to their chosen ﬁeld of study can
diﬀer substantially from their expectations. Another important factor here is that
Norway has a well developed welfare state with a wage range of beneﬁt programs for
unemployed and low income individuals. Hence the importance of the probability
of future employment or unemployment in diﬀerent ﬁelds of study is less signiﬁcant
than in countries with a smaller safety net provided by the state.
High marginal tax rates and a compressed wage structure have the same eﬀect;
they both reduce the wage diﬀerentials in the economy. Thus the price on the edu-
cational types with the higher consumption value (type-A education in the model)
decreases, measured in the foregone wage return by not choosing the educational
types generating higher wage return (type-B education in the model). The univer-
sity sector is highly subsidized in Norway and the students face no tuition fees (unless
at the private institutions, which are few), and all students are entitled to publicly
provided and subsidized student loans. Thus the Norwegian student does not face
the actual costs of the higher education, and he in praxis faces no credit constraints.
Also, the wage diﬀerentials between diﬀerent kinds of education are small. Figure
5 shows that the net of taxes life time income of the highly skilled relative to the
individuals with only high school all decreased over the period, with the exception
20Figure 5: Net of taxes lifetime income for diﬀerent educational groups relative to the
reference group with only high school. Norwegian males and females, 1980 and 1990,
2% and 5% discount rates.











Medical school  6  1.43 1.34 1.3 1.19 
Law school  6 1.24  1.15  1.33  1.23 
MA engineering  5 1.22  1.15  1.23  1.15 
MA science  5 1.15  1.07  1.12  1.03 
Business school  4 1.1  1.09  1.42  1.34 
BA science  3.5 1.1  1.06  1.09  1.03 
BA social science  4 1.08  1.01  1.02  0.96 
MA humanities  6 1.08  1.01  0.94  0.87 
High school   0 1  1  1  1 
BA humanities   4 0.96  0.91  0.93  0.89 
Teacher's college  4 0.95  0.92  0.89  0.85 
Nursing school   3 0.88  0.86  0.87  0.85 
          
Source: Moen and Semmingsen (1996) 
 
of law school and business school. Medical school, law school, Business school, and
Master of engineering all have restricted admission and very high numbers of ap-
plicants each year, and these are the educational types with the higher life time
income relative to high school. These types of education are also considered to re-
quire a great deal of eﬀort to complete. The rest of the educational types are much
easier to be accepted for.
One would expect the Norwegian student to weigh the consumption value of
education heavily when making his educational choice. To some extent this devel-
opment seem to have taken place. Even though the wage return to humanities and
teacher’s college both are smaller than the wage return to ﬁnishing the education at
high school level, an increasing amount of individuals choose this line of study18,a s
is seen from ﬁgure 1
The theory model applied in the analysis of the paper describes the extreme case
where each type of education has either high or low consumption value and high or
low expected wage return. The educational choice is there described as a trade-oﬀ
between type-A and type-B education. But since diﬀerent individuals have diﬀerent
preferences, some will get the higher consumption value, as well as the higher wage,
18This raises the question of whether the educational market is able to distribute talent in the
optimal mannner; do the best skilled individuals choose the more demanding types of education?
See Klette and Møen (2002) for a discussion of this issue.
21from type-B education, and will thus choose that education independent of the
tax system and the compression in the wage system. Apparently some individuals
still have the higher consumption value from some types of education that generate
very low or negative wage return, as seen from the ﬁgures 1 and 5. Based on these
two ﬁgures, one possible organization of the educational types following the theory
chapter would be the following:
Type-R: Medical school, Law School, and Business School.
Type-B: Master of Science and Engineering
Type-A: Bachelor of humanities, teacher’s college, and nursing school.
The individuals choose education type according to their preferences, which in
the theory model are assumed to be exogenous. But the preferences for type of
education are endogenous, and might change as the individual’s understanding of
his own abilities and interests changes. For instance would one expect the individual
to take account of his success probability in the diﬀerent educational directions and
professions when making his educational choice. To some extent the individual’s
preferences for education are shaped during primary school, and very much aﬀected
by his view of what is interesting or not. In this process, the qualiﬁcations and
motivation of the teachers are crucial. The decline in the proportion of students
choosing natural science can be seen in connection with the rapid decline of qualiﬁed
mathematics teachers during the last 20 years. In 1997, more than 70 % of the older
N o r w e g i a nh i g hs c h o o lt e a c h e r sh a dam a s t e r sd e g r e e ,a n dm o r et h a n2 0%o fa l l
the older teachers had a master of natural sciences19.A tt h es a m et i m e ,o n l y2 0%
of the younger high school teachers had a masters degree, and only a couple percent
of all the young teachers had a masters of natural sciences. Poor teaching and lower
level of mathematics skills among the students increases the comprehension that
natural science is a diﬃcult ﬁeld of study which the students wish to avoid when
possible. This could also be a reason for the observed decline in the share of students
majoring in science.
5C o n c l u s i o n .
Economists have thoroughly discussed how the tax system might aﬀect the individ-
ual’s educational level. But the question of how the tax system aﬀects the individ-
19Source: Klette and Møen (2002).
22ual’s choice of educational type is mostly ignored. This is an important question,
since the educational choice of today’s young generation determines the skill com-
position of tomorrow’s labor force and hence the future production possibilities of
the country. This paper studies this problem in a simple partial model. Depending
on the individual’s preferences, a progressive tax system might in fact introduce
distortions in the individuals’s educational choice and induce him to choose more of
the educational type with the higher consumption value. If he also puts more weight
on the present than on the future, this eﬀect is strengthened further. Empirical
evidence from Norway indicates that individuals value the non-monetary return to
educational types, and that many are willing to forego future wage return in order
to enjoy the educational types with higher consumption value.
The theoretical analysis was done in a partial model. Since so many eﬀects are
present side by side with the consumption motive in the educational choice, it is not
possible to draw a uniform policy conclusion from this analysis. The main purpose
of this paper has been to shed some light on one by the literature ignored eﬀect
of taxes, namely the eﬀect on the relative price of diﬀerent types of education as
consumption goods. A natural extension of this model would be to analyze how
the presence of uniform and diﬀerentiated tuition fees would aﬀect the educational
choice of the individual in the presence of taxation when education is considered to
be a consumption good.
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